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By looking at the courts and legislatures as agents of social change, this study seeks to 
assess the impact of judicial decisions in a particularly contentious area, the right to bodily 
privacy.   Specifically, I seek to understand the competing effects of state supreme court 
decisions and state statutes on the consumers of their public policy choices.  Past studies have 
found conflicting results concerning the impact of court decisions.  Literature assessing the effect 
of legislation finds that statutes, which are specific in nature, engender significant effects.  For 
this study I focus specifically on court decisions and legislation that are concerned with access to 
reproductive services, and their impact on abortion rates within five states:  Alabama, Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts from 1973 through 2000.  My preliminary analysis suggests 

























CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of appellate court decisions has garnered significant attention by judicial 
scholars.  While some scholars have found significant effects of particular decisions of the 
Supreme Court, more frequently, scholars have found that the Supreme Court’s ability to affect 
broad changes in public policy is limited.  Most notably among the latter category of scholars are 
Dahl (1957) and Rosenberg (1991). 
In his seminal article on the Supreme Court as a national policy maker, Dahl (1957) 
argued that the Court in general would reflect the national sentiment.  Its decisions will not stray 
far from the national zeitgeist because its membership will on average reflect the preferences of 
the popularly elected president.  Thus while the court may be out of step for short periods of 
time, the appointing power of the president will shape the court so that it reflects public opinion 
over time and thus casts legitimacy on public policy. Dahl concludes his work by stating that “by 
itself the Court is almost powerless to affect the course” of fundamental national policy 
(1957:293).  
Rosenberg (1991) similarly argues that the Supreme Court is limited in its ability to 
significantly change social policy.  This “constrained” view asserts that the Court’s capacity to 
facilitate change is inhibited by its dependence upon popularly elected presidents for its 
membership and its dependence upon others to implement its decisions. 
 Rosenberg argues that courts are essentially incapable of producing significant social 
reform, but courts can supplement social reforms that are initiated by other branches of 
government.   In his examination of the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), he finds that the 
number of abortions preformed increased after the decision in Roe, but argues that this increase 






branches of government significantly ameliorate the effect of appellate court decisions.  While 
the Court maintains structural independence from the other branches of government, its 
dependence upon other actors for the implementation of its decisions significantly limits its 
ability to produce large-scale changes in public policy. 
       Many scholars oppose the conclusions that the Court is constrained in the amount of change 
it produces. Canon and Johnson (1999) consider that Rosenberg miscalculates the Court’s impact 
on salient issues such as abortion and desegregation in schools. They also note the absence of 
important issues that exemplify how the Court produces social change, such as accessibility of 
obscene materials and religion in schools. However, both Rosenberg (1991) and Cannon and 



















CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Contemporary Related Studies 
A number of studies have been conducted examining the impact the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Medalie, Zeitz, and Alexander (1968) examine the 
implementation of Miranda in Washington D.C. by analyzing the defendants’ behavior after 
their arrest, as well as the police practices post-Miranda. They find that police do not 
consistently follow Miranda’s dictates that even when provided Miranda’s warnings, defendants 
continue to provide statements. Seeburger and Wettick (1967) study the impact of Miranda in 
Pittsburgh by analyzing the confession rate pre-Miranda and post-Miranda. Their results are in 
contrast with Medalie et al; they find that there is a significant decline in confessions after the 
Court’s decision in Miranda. The authors attribute this to the impact of the Court’s decision in 
Miranda.  
Gruhl and Welch (1999) examine the impact of the Bakke (1978) decision approving the 
consideration of race as one of a number of factors in admissions process. In this study, they 
specifically focus on the enrollment of African Americans and Hispanics in medical and law 
school.  The authors find mixed results; the Court’s decision had a negative impact on the 
African American and Hispanics applications, but had a positive impact on the rate of acceptance 
to medical and law school.  
 Most of the impact literature has focused on the implementation of Supreme Court 
decisions; Baird (2004) examines how the Court has an impact by the cases that it chooses to 
hear. Baird argues that the Court has a signaling effect on the litigant community to support 
litigation in particular policy areas. Interestingly, Baird notes that the Court needs extra-judicial 






 Early studies of impact focused on the effect of Supreme Court decisions on the 
subsequent behavior of those required implementing the decisions (Peltason 1955; Vines, 1964; 
Birkby, 1966; Lefstein, Stapleton and Teitelbaum 1969; Wasby 1970; Canon 1973, 1974; 
Romans 1974; Wilkes 1974; Gruhl 1980; Comb 1982).  These studies found that public opinion 
and the behavior of elite perceptions were particularly influential in the implementation of 
Supreme Court opinions and thus their eventual impact. 
 In studying the hierarchical nature of the implementation of Supreme Court decisions, 
scholars have argued that lower federal and state courts have sufficient discretion to significantly 
alter, limit or expand the impact of the apex court’s directives (Murphy 1959; Baum 1976, 1980).  
Johnson and Canon’s (1998) seminal work on impact suggests that impact is significantly 
affected by implementation and the actors associated with transforming the verbiage of court 
policy to actual action.  Glick (1994) examines not only the impact of Supreme Court decisions 
on lower courts as well as the impact on lower legislative bodies. His work suggests that lower 
institutions whose prior policies were broader than the Supreme Court’s decision will ignore the 
Court’s decision and adhere to the previous policy. As well the lower institutions whose previous 
policy lags a Supreme Court decision will evolve the policy to meet but not surpass the latest 
Supreme Court decision.   
Most of the literature examining the impact of the court system in the United States 
focuses primarily upon the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court. Johnson and Cannon (1999) study 
the impact of state supreme court decisions and discuss how in several states these decisions do 
have an impact. They focus primarily on the telling impact of 15 state supreme court decisions 






I seek to expand on the impact literature by exploring a particularly salient issue, access 
to abortion services.  In particular, I seek to assess the competing effects of state supreme court 
decisions and state statutory policies on abortion rates.  If the constrained view is correct, I 
would expect state court decisions to have less impact than legislative actions.  Since state courts 
are in large part dependent upon executive and legislative branches to implement their decisions, 
I would expect that legislative action would gain prominence in affecting abortion rates.  That is, 
legislative action aimed at decreasing the number of abortions should have stronger effects than 
state supreme court decisions that do likewise. 
Roe v. Wade and Access to Reproductive Services 
 Previous research on the impact of Roe v. Wade has focused on a number of areas 
potentially affected by the Court’s far-reaching protection of the right to bodily privacy.  Halva-
Neubauer’s (1990) study of Roe’s more conservative progeny, Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services (1989), finds that state courts were important in determining abortion policy.  
Legislatures seem reluctant to tackle the abortion question even when provided the imprimatur of 
a more conservative Supreme Court, restricting the ability of states to “bring about fundamental 
change quickly” (1990, 27).  Nossiff (1994) also finds that states are slow to respond to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.   
 Hansen’s evaluation of access to abortion finds that Medicaid funding had little effect on 
abortion rates once one controls for state population.  Her analysis further demonstrates that over 
time, the greatest increases in access to abortion emerged in the most restrictive states.  However, 
variation in abortion rates were related to variations in funding, hospital services, population, 
religion and political ideologies (Hansen 1980).  Wetstein and Albritton (1995) find significant 






focuses on the complex relationship between public opinion and the adoption of public policy.  
They find abortion policy had “profound effects” on access to abortion providers (1995, 91).  
 Kemp, Carp and Brady’s early work on the effect of Roe suggests that abortion providers 
adhered closely to state statutes, which restricted abortion access.  However, post-Roe analysis 
finds that access increased and hospitals responded to the Court’s decision by adopting more 
“liberalized abortion policies” (1978, 31).  The degree of impact was a function of resource 
variables (the need for increased income) and decisional variables (ideology of decision-makers).  
Bond and Johnson’s seminal study similarly explored hospitals’ provision of abortion services 
and finds that organizational norms have greater impact on the implementation of Supreme Court 
decisions than do community preferences, or incentives and disincentives (1982).  Their work 
also finds significant relationships between community preferences and hospital abortion 
policies, particularly for highly salient issues such as abortion rights (Johnson and Bond 1982). 
 Haas-Wilson’s evaluation of the Court’s restrictions concerning minors’ access to 
abortion finds that parental involvement statutes significantly decreased “minors’ demand for 
abortions” as did state restrictions on Medicaid funding (1996 140).   Her research demonstrates 
that state legislative policies can have significant impact on public behavior.  By restricting both 
funding and facilitation of abortion services, these states decreased the access of minors to 
abortion services. 
 While previous research is instructive, its conclusions are limited.  The research suggests 
that the attitudes of relevant policy makers determine whether the states respond to Supreme 
Court decisions in a restrictive or expansive manner.  I assert that the impact of appellate court 
decisions is ameliorated by a number of factors.  First, I argue that state supreme courts serve as 






implement them.  As such, state supreme courts could have significant impact on public policy.  
However, I argue that state legislatures in particular are well situated to respond to both the 
Supreme Court and the intermediate state supreme courts if sufficiently motivated. State supreme 
courts have many opportunities where they can initiate policy. First, the number of cases that 
state supreme courts hear is large. In the early 1980’s the fifty state supreme courts decided over 
53,000 cases per year, and that number is only rising (U.S. Department of Justice 1983). Second, 
state supreme courts are most often the last court to hear a case. In a sample of 6,000 state 
supreme court decisions, only two percent were appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
and of those only a few were granted review (Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, and Wheeler 1977).  
 Previous research finds that public opinion is significantly related to the policies adopted 
by state legislatures, and I will not reiterate that research here.  I presume that states adopt 
policies that reflect the general sentiment of their constituents, particularly in policies as salient 
as access to abortion.  However, I seek to assess the impact of state supreme courts whose 
decisions can either facilitate or restrict the preferences of state policy makers.   
Competing Institutions 
The Constitution separates the power of government into three different branches of 
government the judicial, legislative, and executive. However, each of these branches of 
government is checked by one another. The President appoints a justice with the consent and 
advice of the Senate, Congress controls the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and its size, and the 
Supreme Court has the power to declare state and federal legislature as well as executive actions 
unconstitutional. The Court was also granted institutional protections, such as life tenure, which 






and able to make decisions that are not bound by the political constraints of Congress and the 
President.  
A core responsibility of the Court is the interpretation of the statutes that have been 
passed by Congress. The point of contention between the court and the legislature, at both the 
federal and state levels is the courts’ power of judicial review. Judicial review allows for courts 
to declare legislation unconstitutional; this power was grated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Marbury v. Madison (1803). Since 1960 the Supreme Court has been overturning statutes 
passed by the President and Congress at an average of two per year. This rate is more than 
double than rate in the beginning of the twentieth century and four times the rate since 1790 
(Baum 1989).  Dahl (1957) is best known for examining the Supreme Court and legislative 
relations. In his study he examines 167 years following the adoption of the Constitution. He finds 
that the Court declared only eighty-six different provisions of federal law unconstitutional, and 
only thirty- eight were struck down within four years of passage. Smith (2005) examines the 
Clear Air Act to exemplify how the Court is an agent of Congress. In this piece of legislation 
Congress controls who can challenge an agency in court, which court has jurisdiction and other 
parameters of judicial action. As well Smith finds that when the executive and the legislature are 
ideologically similar, it will be less likely to turn to the courts.  
Congress has the ability to retaliate if they are unhappy with the Court’s interpretation. 
However, popular pressures and divisions within Congress have restrained Congress from 
intervening with many the Court’s interpretations. When Congress has intervened in the Court’s 
decision it has several different actions that it may take.  The most aggressive action that 
Congress can take against the Court is to initiate the process of creating a constitutional 






action Congress can take against the Court is to simply rewrite a statute that the Court has 
overturned. One study evaluating legislation passed between 1945 and 1957 finds that Congress 
rewrote statutes that reversed twenty-six Supreme Court decisions concerning federal taxation 
and twenty-one decisions on other subjects (Harvard Law Review 1958, Stumpf 1965). 
However, Henschen (1983) reviews 222 Supreme Court cases involving labor and antitrust laws 
between 1950 and 1972. Only 27 of these decisions were subject to congressional action, and of 
those only 9 statutes were passed that overturned the Court’s decision. In recent studies 
(Eskridge 1991 and Solimine and Walker 1992) authors have similar figures as reported above.  
In a more specific study, Beaney and Beiser (1964) examine the impact of the Court’s 
decisions declaring the reading of Bible passages or saying of prayers as a religious exercise in 
public schools as unconstitutional. The authors focus on the Court’s decision in the cases Engel 
v. Vitale (1962) and School District v. Schempp (1963), and the response from Congress.  There 
was a violent response from Congress in regards to Engel. The day after the decision in Engel 
was made Frank Becker, a New York Republican member of Congress, introduced his 
amendments to the Constitution that would allow public schools to conduct religious exercises. 
Merely a month after the Engel decision Senator Eastland’s Judiciary Committee conducted a 
hearing, which allowed a discussion amongst the angered congressional members. The Senators 
who testified at this hearing had hopes of passing a joint resolution that would propose 
amendment to the Constitution to allow prayer and Bible readings in school. The testimonies of 
this hearing also show that those Senators who testified were aware that the Court would soon be 
deciding Schempp which would examine the constitutionality of the recitation of the Lord’s 






 These findings are rather interesting because they demonstrate that the Senators were not 
only interested in what the Court had done previously, but are also affected by what they may do 
in the future.  Even after all the discussion in the Congress following Engel, no legislation was 
passed. After the 1963 decision there was a greater surge of activity from the Congress than there 
had been following Engel; following Schempp there were 140 amendments proposed by 
Congress to reverse the Court’s decision, as opposed to the 75 amendments Congress proposed 
to reverse the Court’s decision in Engel.  
Several pieces of literature examine factors other than institutional preferences that 
correlate with Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions (Hausegger and Baum 1998; 
Henschen 1983; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Ignagni and Meernik 1994 Ignagni, Meernik, King 
1998, and Mooney and Lee 1995.) A uniting factor in all of these studies is the importance of 
case salience, meaning the degree to which a specific case warrants congressional attention. In a 
court case that addresses a more salient issue the literature would suggest that legislatures are 
more likely to respond to a court decision that they did not approve of. In addition, when an issue 
is more salient more deference is given to the legislature, and the court becomes less powerful 
(Vanberg 2001).  
. Canon and Johnson (1999) assert that the impact of the Supreme Court decisions is based 
upon the implementation of their decisions.  The process of implementing Supreme Court 
decisions is a political process, which most often means that the implementation of the Court’s 
decision is dependent upon political actors who are constrained by political pressures. The Court 
is not only limited in its ability to implement the decisions it makes, but is also restrained in its 
oversight of the implementation. The Court must wait until the manner of implementation is 






  The past literature focuses the majority of the research upon the United States Supreme 
Court. Hoeskstra (2005) focuses primarily at the state supreme courts decisions.  She 
concentrates on court decisions and legislation concerning wages and hours, and by doing so 
suggests that state supreme court decisions are influenced not by only U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions but are influenced by state actors as well. Hoekstra suggests that state supreme court 
decisions may not be merely a product of their own policy preferences, but rather a product of 
their as well as those of federal and state actors.  In this study, I further examine the influences of 
the federal and state actors on state supreme court decisions. As well this study expands upon the 
knowledge of the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches of the government at 
the state level.  
Statutory Responses to Reproductive Services 
The 1960s saw a significant increase in efforts to protect reproductive services at both the 
state and federal levels.  After Roe various states began to confirm their laws while others began 
enacting restrictive laws. This trend began because abortion was a state matter and the individual 
state’s action could affect the availability to legal abortion. Following Roe, restrictive and anti 
abortion campaigns were initiated and sought the most restrictive laws on abortion. Many of 
these anti-abortion groups focused their attention at the state and local level in attempts to limit 
the availability of abortions (Craig and O’Brien 1993).   At the end of 1973, 260 abortion-related 
bills were introduced to the different state legislatures; 39 were enacted. In 1974, 189 abortion-
related bills were introduced to the state legislatures, and 19 were enacted (Rosenberg 1991).  
Pro-choice activists began to develop bipartisan political support inside the state legislatures and 






Previous to Roe, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire prohibited all abortions. 
Thirteen different states
1
 allowed abortions to preserve the life of the mother or to protect the 
woman’s physical or mental health.  Mississippi permitted abortions to preserve the life of the 
mother, protect the mother’s physical or mental health and also in cases of rape. However, 
twenty-nine states
2
 only allowed for abortions to preserve the woman’s life (Craig and O’Brien 
1993).  
  Among the first victories claimed by abortion rights’ activists was the 1970 legalization 
of abortion in Hawaii for state residents.  New York further expanded access by not requiring 
residency to attain an abortion.  California emulated New York’s relaxation on residency in their 
legalization of abortion; soon to follow them were Alaska and Washington (Risen and Thomas 
1998, 15-16). Abortion rights’ advocates had limited success after these reforms to make 
reproductive services more available. While 14 different states made abortions legal, under 
certain conditions (Risen and Thomas 1998), 34 states retained restrictive abortion policies 
(Epstein and Kobylka 1992).   Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, which 
many see as the galvanizing event for oppositionists, numbers of states passed legislation aimed 
at restricting access to abortion given their inability to ban it outright.  Table 1 notes the different 
statutes aimed at restricting reproductive services that were passed among the various states. The 
statutes may differ slightly across states, but are fundamentally the same in their substance and 
purpose. 
                                                 
1
 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
2
 Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 











The goal of this law is that all patients understand the procedure and the risks associated with 
it. There are two difficulties with this restriction. First, a mandatory counseling restriction is 
usually a repetitive action, because doctors are required by law to discuss procedures and 




This restriction requires that women wait a certain time period after they have been read or 
given materials containing information on the abortion procedure. Legislators assert that this 
law is intended to make sure that women have thought about the procedure and its following 




These types of restrictions garner the greatest public support. The argument is that parental 





These restrictions limit where and who can perform abortions. Many regulations concerning 
abortions are associated with safety issues; however; these restrictions significantly increase 
the cost of services.  
 
Gag Rules This is a restriction that prohibits workers in state-run healthcare facilities from mentioning 
abortion as an option with patients. This restriction largely limits the access of abortions to 
low income women.  
 
TRAP Laws Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers are restrictions that target medical doctors and 
facilities that perform abortions, and inflict more taxing requirements that are stricter than for 
other medical procedures. 
 
Abortion Bans These are bans that were usually enacted before the Roe decision and never were dismissed. 





This statute maintains that the husband be either notified or give his consent for the abortion 
to occur.   The Supreme Court has banned spousal consent. 
 
Refusal Clause This constraint on abortion maintains that a federally funded healthcare facility may deny 
women abortion services.  
 
 
Table 2 denotes statutes passed by states that protect the right to reproductive services.  
These include the right to have an abortion and the right to contraceptives. These statutes differ 
between individual states, but are considered similar in their nature and objectives. Table 3 
identifies which states have passed legislation that is restrictive of receiving reproductive 










This essentially protects women’s fundamental right to an abortion to a greater 
degree than the federal Constitution.  
 
Public Funds This law declares that low-income women will have financial assistance for an 
abortion in situations when the women’s health is at risk and situations of rape or 
incest.  
 
Emergency Contraceptive This law states that sexual assault victims must receive information related to 
emergency contraception in hospital emergency rooms. Some of these laws have an 
amendment that allows doctors to refuse to do this based on their religious or moral 
beliefs.  
 
Protection from Clinic 
Violence 
This regulation is enacted to protect those going to a medical facility that performs 
abortions from protestors. Protestors are regulated as to how close they may come to 
the facility when trying to persuade others in anyway about the abortion procedure.  
 
Guaranteed Access This protection is in place so that women may get their contraceptives from a 




This law enforces health insurance companies that cover prescription drugs to 
provide equal coverage for contraceptives. 
 
 
what is clear from Table 3 is that every state passed some limitation on abortion access.  What is 
unclear from previous studies is the effect that these statutes had on abortion rates, and 
particularly when these statutes are balanced against restrictive and permissive decisions of state 
supreme courts. Table 4 provides types of protective statutes passed by particular states and 
Table 4 lists which states have adopted which types of protective statutes.  In contrast to Table 3, 
there are a number of states that have passed no statutory protections of reproductive services for 
women.  Table 4 provides types of protective statutes passed by particular states and Table 4 lists 
which states have adopted which types of protective statutes.  In contrast to Table 3, there are a 




































          
AL x-1  X X x-2 X  X X 
AK x-1  X  x-2,1 X X X  
AZ x-1    x-2 X  X X 
AR x-1  X X x-2 X X X  
CA     x-2,1   X  
CO x-1 x-1   x-3   X  
CT      X X X  
DE x-1  x-1 X x-3   X  
DC          
FL x-1  x-1  w-3,1 X  X  
GA     x-3 X X X  
HI      X X X  
ID x-1  X X x-2,1 X X X  
IL x-1 x-1   x-3,1 X  X X 
IN x-1  X X x-2 X X X X 
IA x-1    x-3   X  
KS   X X x-3    X 
KY x-1 x-1 x-4 X x-3 X  X X 
LA x-1 x-1 X X x-2 X  X X 
ME   X  x-2   X  
MD     x-3   X  
MA x-1  X x-1 x-2 X X X  
MI x-1  X X x-2 X  X X 
MN   X X x-3 X X X X 
MS x-1  X X x-2 X X X X 
MO x-1  x-1 x-1 x-2 X X X X 
MT   x-1 X-1 X-3,1   X  
NE x-1  X X x-3   X X 
NV     x-3,1 X X X  
NH     x-3,1     
NY x-1    x-3,1 X X X  
NM x-1    x-2,1   X  
NY      X X X  
NC     x-2 X X X  
ND x-1 x-1 X X x-2 X X X x-1 
OH x-1  X X x-3 X X X X 
OK x-1    x-2,1  X X  
OR          
PA  x-1 X X x-2 X X X X 
RI x-1 x-1 X  x-2 X X X  
SC x-1 x-1 X X x-2 X X X X 
SD x-1  X X x-3 X X X  
TN x-1  x-1 x-1 x-2 X X X  
TX   X X x-3 X  X  
UT x-1 x-1 X X x-3 X X X  










(Table 3 Continued) 
 
VA x-1  X X x-2 X X X X 
WA        X  
WV x-1  X X x-3     
WI x-1  X X x-2 X X X X 
WY     x-2   X  
 
Note:   
1. State’s law in this are has been found unconstitutional and unenforceable 
2. State requires parental consent of either one or two parents 
3. State requires parental  notice of either one or two parents 
4. Kentucky’s counseling la w is unconstitutional only in the requirement that the state-mandated information 
and materials be delivered in person 
Source: Who Decides? The Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States, 15
th
 ed. (Washington, 



























Alabama       
Alaska X  X  X  
Arizona  X X  X  
Arkansas       
California X X X X X X 
Colorado    X   
Connecticut  X X X X X 
Delaware  X     
District of 
Columbia 
   X   
Florida     X  
Georgia  X     
Hawaii X X X    
Idaho       
Illinois X X X  X  
Indiana     X  
Iowa  X  X   
Kansas    X   
Kentucky       
Louisiana       
Maine X X  X  X 
Maryland  X X X  X 
Massachusetts  X X X X  
Michigan    X   
Minnesota   X X X  
Mississippi       
Missouri  X     
Montana   X  X  
Nebraska       
Nevada  X  X  X 
New Hampshire  X     
New Jersey   X  X  
New Mexico X X X  X  
New York X X X X   
North Carolina  X  X   
North Dakota       
Ohio       
Oklahoma       
Oregon X  X X X  
Pennsylvania  X     
Rhode Island  X     






(Table 4 continued) 
South Dakota       
Tennessee     X  
Texas       
Utah       
Vermont  X X  X X 
Virginia       
Washington X X X X  X 
West Virginia   X  X  
Wisconsin  X  X   







CHAPTER 3 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data  
I seek to explore the impact of legislative and judicial policies.  Specifically, I seek to 
assess the effect of statutory policy and state supreme court decisions on abortion rates.  While 
previous research suggests that legislative policy narrowly tailored can have significant effects 
(Goodin 1977; LeLoup 1978; Frantzich 1979; Lewis-Beck and Alford 1980; Ethridge 1981; 
Oppenheimer 1983; Abney and Lauth 1987 among others), research on judicial impact has been 
less clear.  Because I am embarking on an initial study of competing effects, I have no clear 
theoretical expectations.  However, given that legislatures have the capacity to respond to 
appellate court challenges to statutory language, I anticipate that over time, legislatures will have 
more significant effects on public policy than will the judiciary,    
To assess the competing effects of legislative and judicial action, I have selected five 
states for analysis:  Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts.  The selection of 
these states was guided primarily by the desire to ensure that one state was selected from each 
region. Geographical region ha soften been addresses as a contextual variable that affects judicial 
decision-making. Carp and Rowland (1983) find that judicial decisions are more conservative in 
the South and West than their fellow courts in the North and Midwest also ensured that these 
states differ in the laws, which they have passed. Table 5 lists the different restrictive laws that 
each of the state legislatures included in my study has passed.  
 The dependent variable for this study is the abortion rate computed for each state from 1973 
to 2000.  Taking the number of legal abortions performed as reported by the Center for Disease 
Control in the state and dividing it by the total number of fertile women in the state for Disease 






Table 5. State Legislative Actions among States Included in the Analysis 
 
State Restrictive Laws  
Alabama Abortion ban, Biased counseling & mandatory delay, Counseling ban/Gag rule, 
Physician-only restriction, Public funds restriction, Restricts minor’s access, 
TRAP, Post-viability restriction, Hospital requirement. 
Colorado Abortion ban, Husband consent, Insurance prohibition, Physician-only 
restriction, Refusal, Public funds restriction, Restricts minor’s access. 
 
Florida Abortion ban, Biased counseling, Physician-only restriction, Refusal, Public 
funds restriction, Restricts minor’s access, TRAP, Post-viability restriction, Fetal 
homicide law. 
 
Illinois Abortion ban, Counseling/Gag rule, Husband consent, Insurance prohibition, 
Anti-choice legislative declaration, Physician-only restriction, Refusal, Restricts 
minor’s access, TRAP, Post-viability restriction, Fetal homicide law. 
 
Massachusetts  Abortion ban, Biased counseling & mandatory delay, Insurance prohibition, 
Physician-only restriction, Refusal, Restricts minor’s access, TRAP, Post-
viability restriction, Hospital requirement, Fetal homicide law. 
 
 
formulate the abortion rate. The number of fertile women is comprised of the population 
of women between the ages of 15 and 44 as reported by the U. S. Census Bureau.   
I include two primary measures of public policy – legislative and judicial.  To measure 
states’ abortion policies I use Doan’s index of abortion statutes (Doan 2007).  Two variables 
were combined to create the index.  First, a variable for all legislative action in any year that was 
restrictive in nature was created.  All legislation in any year that restricted the right to bodily 
privacy was given a score of 1 with each year’s score added to the previous year.  A similar 
variable was created for legislation that protected the right to bodily privacy.  Each state was 
then assigned an index calculated annually by subtracting the protective statutes from those that 
restricted bodily privacy.  Positive scores indicate more conservative policies while negative 
scores indicate more protective policies.  The state legislative index ranged from a minimum of 0 






Similarly, the state supreme court index is calculated for state court decisions.  State 
supreme court decisions were gathered from LexisNexis and were coded as either restrictive or 
protective.  These decisions were cumulatively calculated over time for each state in the manner 
noted above.  Thus, state supreme courts with negative annual scores were more protective of 
bodily privacy in their decisions while those with positive scores were more restrictive.  The 
state supreme court index had a minimum of -7 and a maximum of 4 with a mean score of -.12.  
Clearly state legislatures are much more conservative in their behavior than are the state supreme 
courts. 
I also include control variables for income and ideology, as well as a counter variable to 
assess temporal effects.  I expect that states with greater individual income will have lower 
abortion rates.  I use the non-inflated per capita income for each state; data are derived from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. I also expect lower abortion rates in states with more conservative political 
ideologies. I use state ideology data from the state citizen and government ideology dataset 
(Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson 1998).  I use the expanded Berry et al. data to cover the 
years 1973 to 2000.  I assess temporal effects by placing a continuous counter variable for each 
state over time. I also include dummy variables for each state in the analysis.  For reference 
purposes, Colorado is the excluded state. 
I evaluate the affects of United States Supreme Court decisions on the state supreme 
court decisions by examining two significant Court cases; Webster v. Reproductive Services (492 
U.S. 490 [1989]) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (505 U.S. 833 [1992]). The Supreme Court 
in Webster the Supreme Court permitted a number of restrictions that were passed by the 
Missouri legislature including viability testing at 20-weeks (eliminating the trimester approach of 






Casey the Court upheld requirements of parental notification, 24-hour waiting periods and 
informed consent.  These cases are given a score of 0 prior to the date of the decision and 1 
following the decision. It is expected that the United States Supreme Court decisions will have a 
negative effect on access to abortion rights by providing groundwork for legislation that limits 
access. Therefore, if the U.S. Supreme Court is more restrictive in their court decisions 
concerning reproductive rights, both the state supreme courts and the state legislatures have 
permission if the choose to be more restrictive in their decisions concerning reproductive rights.  
I measure the affect of the governor on state legislation by creating a variable that 
compares the political party of the state’s executive and legislature. The data is derived from the 
State Partisan Balance data. From these data, I create a variable that when the majority of the 
legislature is comprised of Democrats and the Governor is a Democrat, a score of –1 is assigned. 
When the majority of the legislature and the executive are in opposition a score of 0 is assigned, 
and when the majority of the legislature is comprised of Republicans and the Governor is a 
Republican, a score of 1 is assigned.  In one particular year and state there are an even number of 
Democrats and Republicans in the state legislature, with a Governor who is a Democrat; I code 
this –1. I believe that when a state receives a score of –1, judicial and legislative decisions will 
be more protective of reproductive rights. Thus, when a state receives a score of 1 the state’s 
court decisions and legislation will be more restrictive of reproductive rights.  
 
Analysis  
Given our pooled cross sectional research design, I estimate the models using feasible 






order autocorrelation often found in OLS regression estimates with pooled data (Gujarati 1995; 



























CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results 
The results suggest that both legislative and judicial actions are significantly related to 
abortion rates however, state statutes significantly increased abortion rates while state supreme 
court decisions significantly decrease abortion rates.  Given that most state statutes were 
intended to restrict abortion access and most of the state supreme court decisions protected 
access, the results suggest that state legislative actions are not having the intended effects.  
 However, it is important to consider the control variables included in the model.  First, 
those states with higher income levels have significantly lower rates of abortion.  Conversely, 
those states with more liberal ideologies, at least as I have measured them, have lower rates of 
abortions.  Moreover, only Alabama had lower abortion rates when compared to our excluded 
category of Colorado.  In addition, Alabama was the only state that was significantly different.  
The Supreme Court decisions in Webster and Casey had no significant affects on abortion rates. 
Our counter variable indicates that abortion rates have increased over the course of our decades-
long series. Lastly, the states with more conservative executive and legislative branches of the 
state government, as were measured here; the lower the abortion rates were within the state.  
Discussion 
While it is extremely difficult to formulate concrete inferences from such a preliminary 
analysis, the results appear to suggest that court decisions limiting access to reproductive 
services decrease the number of times women choose to terminate pregnancies.  Conversely, 
statutory restrictions actually have the unintended consequences of increasing the numbers of 
abortions performed among women of childbearing years. While these results are curious, I 







Table 6.  Regression Coefficients for Abortion Rates with All Restrictive Statutes 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Coefficient        z       Significance  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court Decisions     -.0068894     -3.30      0.001 ***       
Legislation     .0099122   3.94      0.000 ***    
Ideology    -.0000103     -0.003   0.976     
Income     -.0000081              -3.66                               0.000 ***    
Counter     .0059919   2.49   0.013** 
Alabama    -.0886879                  -3.09   0.000 ***    
Florida       .0199594                    0.97   0.330 
Illinois       .0178299                1.13   0.259 
Massachusetts      .0368025                1.31   0.191 
State Government    -.0068309                  -1.72                              0.085* 
Webster     -.0082082                    -0.90   0.370 
Casey      -.009137                  -1.02                            0.309 




N  139 
R
2
  0.741 
Wald χ
2
   232.33 
Prob (χ
2
)      0.0000 
 
restrictions appear to be more symbolic than effective.  The effects of legislative action may also 
be partially absorbed within the citizen ideology and state government variables, which tap 
general perspectives on the appropriateness of abortion as an option for reproductive choice.  
The results, however, clearly indicate that both have highly significant effects on abortion rates 
















CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions 
These results demonstrate the importance of research on the impact of judicial decisions.  
This research contributes to the previous literature in several important ways.  First, the research 
expands on the judicial literature by studying state supreme courts.  Previous literature has 
focused primarily on the influence of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Our 
research focuses on state supreme courts and demonstrates their significance, at least in the 
limited analysis conducted here.  Second, our research extends the work of previous scholars by 
assessing the competing effects of legislative and judicial bodies.  While tentative, our work 
suggests that both have significant effects, but not in the ways necessarily intended.  The 
unintended findings can be attributed to several different reasons. Due to the nature of the 
findings one can suppose that even though the legislature passes statutes concerning access to 
reproductive rights, the bodies, which implement these laws, do not comply until the statute has 
been approved through a court decision.  
Given the controversial nature of our findings, I am careful to point out its limitations.  
First, as with all impact literature, it is difficult to parcel the effects given the complex nature of 
human behavior.  To more accurately assess the effect of legislative and judicial actions, one 
would ideally seek to survey women of childbearing years and assess their choices concerning 
their reproductive behavior.  While I assess abortion rates, abortion is only one choice available 
to women.  Research must consider the full panoply of choices available and determine why one 
was selected as opposed to another and the effect that legislative and judicial actions played in 






Second, our analysis only includes five states.  Expanded analysis including all 50 states 
would provide more a comprehensive understanding of the complex issue of the effect of 
legislative and judicial action on the exercise of the right to bodily privacy. 
Third, our analysis evaluates the competing effects of two institutions – judiciaries and 
legislatures.  Future research should also include the role that the executive branch also plays.  
Governors serve as administrators over dozens of state agencies that affect reproductive choices.  
Among these are health services, state financial aid, education policy and others. 
Fourth, our analysis provides only cursory insight into a very complex issue.  Future 
research would also need to include additional control variables that certainly compete for 
theoretical purchase.  There are two issues that are not controlled for in this study that would 
need to be included in future studies; these issues are the impact of both public opinion and 
interest groups. In the literature concerning the availability of reproductive rights there is a 
substantial amount of work done examining the large influence that interest groups and public 
opinion have on access to reproductive rights. However, at this point in time measurements at the 
state level are not available, but should be included in future work. Other variables needed would 
include the religiosity of the state, literacy rates, high school graduation rates, college graduation 
rates, women as a percentage of the workforce, teen pregnancy rates, and the general provision 
of health care, among others.  While this list is not comprehensive, future research must include 
variables that contribute to women’s general reproductive choices. Nonetheless, I believe that 
this effort provides some initial insight into the impact of judicial decisions on the significant 
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